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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KYLE JASON YAGER,
Defendant.

Case No. 20010956-CA
Priority No.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on the court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action may take an appeal to the
court of appeal from a final order on a misdemeanor offense. In this case the Honorable
Anthony B. Quinn, of the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction for the offense of Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code §
11.24.020 (2001), and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B Misdemeanor, in
violation of Salt lake City Code § 11.20.040 (2001). A copy of the judgment is attached
in Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Denying the Motion to Continue

When Discovery Had Not Been Received from the City Prosecutor's Office until Three
Days Prior to Trial
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(g) "grants a trial court ample discretion to
remedy any prejudice to a party resulting from a breach of the criminal discovery rules."
State v. Larson. 775 P.2d 415 (Utah 1989); State v. Knight 743 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah
1987); Utah R. Crim. P. 16. "If the trial court denies the relief requested under Rule
16(g), that denial may constitute an abuse of discretion warranting a reversal." Knight,
743 P.2d at 918. "Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying those motions
therefore depends entirely upon a determination of whether the prosecutor's failure to
produce the requested information resulted in prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal."
IdLat919.

2.

Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Denying the Motion to Continue

When a Necessary and Essential Witness for the Defense Could Not Be Contacted Prior
to Trial to Testify on the Defendant's Behalf
Standard of Review:
"The decision to grant or deny a requested continuance lies within the broad
discretion of the trial court, and [this Court] will not disturb such a decision absent a clear
2

abuse of discretion." State v. Begishe. 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing
State v. Cabututan. 861 P.2d 408,413 (Utah 1993)); see also State v. Knight. 743 P.2d
913, 918-19 (Utah 1987).

PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant's Motion to Continue based on the late receipt of discovery and the need
to call an essential witness to testify on Appellant's behalf is preserved on the Transcript
of the Bench Trial ("Tr.") 1, 3.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
United States Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.
United States Constitution, Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
3

person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf...

The relevant portions of the statutes under which Mr. Yager was convicted are
reproduced here:
11.24.020 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES-POSSESSION PROHIBITED
A. No person shall knowingly or intentionally possess or use a
controlled substance, as defined in the Controlled Substances Act of the
Utah Code Annotated 1953, or its successor, unless it is obtained pursuant
to a valid prescription or order, or directly from a practitioner authorized to
prescribe such substances, while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by the Controlled Substances
Act.
Salt Lake City Code § 11.24.020 (2001)

11.20.040 UNLAWFUL ACTS INVOLVING DRUG PARAPHERNALIA.
A. It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use,
drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test,
analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or
otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation
of this chapter.
B. It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to
deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia,
knowing that the drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate,
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce,
process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal,
inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the
human body in violation of this chapter.
Salt Lake City Code § 11.20.040 (2001).
4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On August 27, 2001, Mr. Yager was found guilty after a bench trial before the
Honorable Judge Anthony B. Quinn of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class B
misdemeanor in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11.24.020 (2001), and Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code §
11.20.040 (2001). Tr. 35-36; R. 27-30. Mr. Yager was sentenced at the conclusion of the
trial and judgment was entered that same day. Id, On September, 24,2001, Mr. Yager
filed his Notice of Appeal of the convictions. R. 31-32.
Mr. Yager appeals his convictions on the grounds that he was not given a full and
fair opportunity to prepare and present his case nor call witnesses on his behalf when
defense attorney did not receive discovery from the city until three days prior to the trial
and an essential witness for Mr. Yager could not be subpoenaed in time for the bench
trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 24, 2001, defendant, Kyle Yager was observed by two police officers
sitting on the front porch of a private residence with another person, later identified as
Breanna Horvath. Tr. 6. The residence was located on 1941 South 700 East. Tr. 5. The
officers were sitting in an unmarked police car, across the street, in a side street, during
rush hour traffic. Tr. 9-10. The officer stated at trial that he observed Mr. Yager take a
pipe from his companion and put it to his mouth. Tr. 6. The officer also stated that he
5

observed Mr. Yager hand the pipe back to the woman. Id. The officer believed the pipe
to be a marijuana pipe. Id.
The officer testified that he and a second officer drove to the residence, parking on
seventh east, crossed the lawn and climbed onto the porch. Tr. 7. Upon their arrival,
Officer Wahlin stated that Mr. Yager's companion admitted that she threw the pipe away.
Id. The officer also stated that she showed him where she threw the pipe. Id. The officer
obtained it from the area she indicated. Id
The officer stated that Mr. Yager and his companion both admitted to smoking the
pipe. Tr. 13. Mr. Yager denied on direct examination ever admitting that he smoked
from the pipe. Tr. 30. He stated at trial that when questioned by the officers, he said,
"I'll see you in court and I had no statements at all." Id, Officer Brede admitted that Ms.
Horvath had stated to him that it was not illegal to smoke marijuana. Tr. 22. He also
heard her admit that she owned the pipe. Id. Ms. Horvath also admitted to the officer
that she owned the marijuana as well. Id.
Mr. Yager and Breanna Horvath were charged with Possession of Controlled
Substance, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11.24.020
(2001) and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt
Lake City Code § 11.20.040 (2001).
Mr. Yager was appointed counsel at his pre-trial conference, on July 16,2001.
Record on Appeal ("R.") 15. On July 25, Mr. Yager appeared before the court on a
second pre-trial conference. R. 16-17. Counsel was not present with him. R. 17.
6

Despite the absence of his court appointed counsel, he was set for a bench trial for August
27,2001. Id
The Appearance of Counsel and Demand for a Trial by Jury was filed on August
15,2001. R. 24. The Request for Discovery was filed the same day. R. 21-23.
Discovery was not received by the city prosecutor until August 23,2001, the Thursday
before the scheduled trial on Monday, August 27, 2001. Tr. 25-26.
On the date of the trial, defense counsel requested a continuance because there was
a possible motion to suppress. Tr. 2. Moreover, Mr. Yager wished to call a witness to
testify on his own behalf, the co-defendant, Breanna Horvath. Tr. 2-3. Ms. Horvath
would have testified that Mr. Yager was not smoking the marijuana. Tr. 3. The request
for a continuance was denied. Tr. 3. Mr. Yager proceeded to trial and was convicted on
both counts. Tr. 35.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial judge abused his discretion in denying Mr. Yager's motion for a
continuance prior to trial. Defense counsel had only received discovery the Thrusday
prior to trial on Monday and therefore had insufficient time to prepare Mr. Yager's
defense. Mr. Yager's counsel did not have the opportunity to investigate his case
thoroughly, interview witnesses, or subpoena witnesses to testify. He was denied his
right to due processes by being compelled to proceed when he was unable to make a full
and vigorous defense to his case.
7

Additionally, as a consequence of the denial, Mr. Yager was unable to produce a
material witness to testify, denying him his constitutional right to compel witnesses to
testify on his behalf. This material witness would have testified to Mr. Yager's actions on
the date of the offense and to any statements he made to the officers. Such testimony
would have countered the evidence put forth by the city prosecutor.
Mr. Yager respectfully requests this Court to reverse and remand for a new trial
since Mr. Yager was materially prejudiced by the trial court's denial of the timely motion
to continue. Had the continuance been granted, the outcome of his trial could have been
different.

ARGUMENT
Mr. Yager's right to a fair trial was violated when the trial judge denied his request
for a continuance and his defense counsel was therefore unable to adequately prepare for
the case and investigate a possible motion or to timely subpoena an essential witness to
testify on his behalf. The granting of a continuance is at the discretion of the trial judge.
State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). A trial judge's decision regarding a
continuance will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id However, when
fundamental rights are at issue, whether a trial judge abused his discretion should be
looked at more closely. See e.g.. People v. Spears. 474 N.E.2d 1189, 1190 (N.Y. 1984)
(holding that when the protection of fundamental rights is involved in requests for
adjournments, that discretionary power is more narrowly construed). And when it is
8

found that a trial judge's discretionary decision denies the defendant a constitutional
right, that decision should always be considered an abuse of discretion. Employers
Insurance of Wausau v. Horton. 797 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1990)
(holding that the denial of a constitutional right should always be construed to be an
abuse of judicial discretion); see also In re Shaquanna ML 767 A.2d 155, 163-164 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2000) (holding that when constitutional interests are at stake, analysis should
turn on whether a due process violation exists). By denying Mr. Yager's motion to
continue, the trial judge denied Mr. Yager's constitutional right to due process.
A person shall not "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. Const, amend. V.; Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. An essential part of the due process
of law, and the right to a fair trial, is "an opportunity to defend." State v. Maestas. 815
P.2d 1319, 1325 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Provo Citv v. Werner. 810 P.2d 469,472 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991). Mr. Yager did not have an adequate opportunity to defend himself
against the allegations against him because he did not have sufficient time to fully prepare
for the bench trial and because he was unable to timely subpoena an essential witness to
speak on his behalf.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
MOTION TO CONTINUE WHEN DISCOVERY HAD NOT BEEN
RECEIVED FROM THE CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE UNTIL
THREE DAYS PRIOR TO TRIAL

Inherent in the opportunity to defend is the right of the accused to have an
adequate opportunity to prepare a defense. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063,1069 (Utah

9

Ct. App. 1995); Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983). Defense counsel
has a duty to investigate the facts of the case, interview prospective defense witnesses,
and procure defense witnesses. State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990) (holding
counsel's failure to investigate and procure defense witnesses was ineffective assistance
of counsel). Counsel must interview a potential defense witness before a reasonable
decision can be made as to whether or not to call the witness at trial. Id
Here, because of the late receipt of discovery, defense counsel did not have time to
adequately investigate the case or arrange for the presence of an essential witness. Tr. 13. Mr. Yager was denied his opportunity to fully defend himself and prepare a defense
when the trial court denied his request to continue the trial because the city prosecutor
had not sent discovery until the Thursday before the bench trial date on Monday.
Templm, 805 P.2d at 188; see also State v. Fairclough. 44 P.2d 692, 694 (Utah 1935)
(holding that "[i]t is a general rule, and justice requires, that a person charged with a
crime should have a reasonable time to prepare his defense, otherwise a defendant's right
to a fair and impartial trial might be nullified.").
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(g) "grants a trial court ample discretion to
remedy any prejudice to a party resulting from a breach of the criminal discovery rules."
State v. Larson. 775 P.2d 415,418 (Utah 1989); State v. Knight 743 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah
1987); Utah R. Crim. P. 16. "[I]f the trial court denies the relief requested under Rule
16(g), that denial may constitute an abuse of discretion warranting a reversal." Knight.
743P.2dat918.
10

In State v. Begishe. 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the Utah Court of
Appeals listed the factors considered in reviewing the denial of the request for
continuance because of a discovery violation:
(1) the extent of appellant's diligence in his efforts to ready his defense
prior to the date set for trial; (2) the likelihood that the need for a
continuance could have been met if the continuance had been granted; (3)
the extent to which granting the continuance would have inconvenienced
the court and the opposing party; and (4) the extent to which the appellant
might have suffered harm as a result of the court's denial.
Id. (citing United States v. Flvnt 756 F.2d 1352,1358 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Mr. Yager's bench trial date was set without the presence of his defense attorney
on July 25,2001. R. 17. After receiving notification of Mr. Yager's trial date, an
Appearance of Counsel and Request for Discovery were sent on August 15, 2001. R. 2124. The reply was received eight days later, on Thursday, August 23, 2001. R. 25-26.
The trial was held on August 27, 2001, the following Monday. R. 27-29. Upon the
receipt of discovery, on Thursday, defense counsel met with Mr. Yager to discuss his case
on the Friday before trial. Tr. 3. After discussing his case, defense counsel realized a
possible motion to suppress and the need to subpoena Mr. Yager's witness. Tr. 1-2, 3.
However, there was no time to pursue either of these matters before trial. At the time of
trial, therefore, defense counsel advised the court of these issues, requesting a
continuance so she could adequately prepare Mr. Yager's defense. Tr. 1-3. Defense
counsel exercised what diligence was possible under the time constraints caused by the
late receipt of the discovery.

11

The continuance should have been granted because a new date could easily have
been obtained for Mr. Yager. There had not been a special setting for his bench trial.
The date set had been a regularly scheduled misdemeanor city day on the court's
schedule. The next available city date would have been sufficient and would not have
unreasonably delayed the trial. See Lavton City v. Longcrier. 943 P.2d 655, 660 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) cert, denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah) and cert, denied. 523 U.S. 1125,118
S.Ct. 1811, 140 L.Ed.2d 949 (1998) (stating that "merely having to reschedule a thirtyminute trial is not a great inconvenience for a trial court").
Moreover, granting the continuance would not have greatly inconvenienced the
court or the opposing party. As the original trial date was set on a misdemeanor city day,
the new date could also have been set on another misdemeanor city day, when all parties
could have sufficient notice and would be present.1 Both the city prosecutor and defense
attorney would have been present not only for Mr. Yager's bench trial, but for the other
city cases routinely handled on such days, such as pre-trial, sentencing, orders to show
*Mr. Yager was, in fact, given the bench trial date without the presence of counsel,
in violation of his right to counsel. R. 17; U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const., Art. I §
12; Wagstaff v. Barnes. 802 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Once appointed, Mr.
Yager was entitled to the presence of counsel "at all critical stages of his criminal
proceeding. Wagstaff, 802 P.2d at 778. A pre-trial conference is a critical proceeding
because it is at this hearing that plea negotiations are made and the defendant is able to
make an informed decision, with the advice of counsel, to plead or try his case. See State
v. Ford. 793 P.2d 397, 404 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (finding that "it is entirely likely" that
defendant was prejudiced by entering into a plea bargain without benefit of counsel,
vacating sentence and remanding to trial court"). There is no showing in the record that
Mr. Yager knowingly or voluntarily waived his right to counsel at this proceeding. State
v. Bakalov. 1999 UT 45, ffi| 15-16, 979 P.2d 799. The denial of his right to counsel at this
critical stage also warrants a new trial.
12

cause, and other bench trials.
Not only was Mr. Yager denied his constitutional right to due process, the denial
of the continuance also implicated his right to compel the attendance of witnesses to
speak on his behalf. U.S. Const., amend. VI; Utah Const. Art. I, § 12; Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); State v. Schreuder. 712 P.2d
264, 275-75 (Utah 1985). Because of the late receipt of discovery, defense counsel was
unable to subpoena Breanna Horvath, the co-defendant, who was willing to testify on his
behalf at his trial. Ms. Horvath's testimony would have been both material and favorable
to Mr. Yager's defense. Schreuder. 712 P.2d at 274-75 (holding that "in order to
establish a violation of [defendant's] constitutional right to compulsory process,
[defendant] must make some plausible showing that the testimony of the absent witness
'would have been both material and favorable to his defense.'") (citing United States v.
Valenzuela-BernaL 458 U.S. 858, 873, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3449, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982)).
Ms. Horvath would have claimed responsibility for the pipe and the marijuana, and
supported Mr. Yager's contention that he had not smoked marijuana that day.
Certainly, the absence of Ms. Horvath was prejudicial because Mr. Yager stood
alone against the testimony of two police officers. Ms. Horvath could have provided an
independent perspective on the actions of the officers and Mr. Yager. Yet defense
counsel was unable to subpoena her nor provide her with sufficient notice in order for her
to attend, as she stated to the trial court. Tr. 2-3.
Considering the small amount of inconvenience in rescheduling Mr. Yager's bench
13

trial, the harm he suffered by proceeding to trial unprepared greatly outweighs it. He was
denied his constitutional right to due process by being unable to fully put forth a defense
to his case and he was unable to have the testimony of witnesses on his behalf in violation
of his right to compel witnesses. Rawlings. 893 P.2d at 1069; Templin. 805 P.2d at 188;
Knight. 743 P.2d at 918; Schreuder. 712 P.2d at 274-75. The scope of the harm caused
by the denial of the continuance warrants a new trial in Mr. Yager's case.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
THE MOTION TO CONTINUE WHEN A NECESSARY AND
ESSENTIAL WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE COULD NOT BE
PRESENT AT TRIAL TO TESTIFY ON DEFENDANT'S
BEHALF

The trial court's refusal to grant defense counsel's request prevented her from
performing her duty to her client to adequately prepare his case for trial. A trial court errs
in denying a request for a continuance when the moving party adequately establishes that
the "denial of the motion will prevent the party from obtaining material and admissible
evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks can be produced within a reasonable time,
and that it has exercised due diligence in preparing the case before requesting the
continuance." State v. Oliver. 820 P.2d 474,476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert denied. 843
P.2d 516 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Linden. 761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988)); see also
State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d at 752.
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A.

The Denial of the Motion to Continue Prevented Defense Counsel
from Producing an Essential Witness to Testify on Mr. Yager's
Behalf and Therefore Prevented Him from Obtaining Material and
Admissible Evidence

Prior to trial, defense counsel stated that Mr. Yager had a witness that planned to
testify and had agreed to testify for Mr. Yager. Tr. 2-3. That witness was Ms. Horvath,
the co-defendant in his case. Ms. Horvath could have testified to the circumstances of her
and Mr. Yager's arrest, and any statements he may have made to the officers. She could
also have confirmed her own statements and shed light on Mr. Yager's actions that day.
Ms. Horvath's testimony would have been both material and admissible. Ms.
Horvath was present when all the events took place and therefore had direct personal
knowledge. See Utah R. Evid. 602 (2002). She was in fact Mr. Yager's co-defendant.
Moreover, because she had already admitted her guilt in the matter and been sentenced
previous to Mr. Yager's trial, there was no possibility of a Fifth Amendment barrier to her
testimony. See Judgment and Conviction of Breanna Horvath in Addendum B.
Ms. Horvath's testimony would also have been material. For testimony to be
considered material and therefore its exclusion prejudicial, there must be "a reasonable
probability that its presence would affect the outcome of the trial. 'A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.'" State
v. Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264, 274 (Utah 1985) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)).
The central areas of contention between the officers and Mr. Yager were whether
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he took the pipe and smoked marijuana and whether he made any admissions to the
officers upon his arrest. Mr. Yager stated at his trial that he did not smoke marijuana on
that day and that he did not make any admissions to the officers. Tr. 30, 34. He stated he
told officers, "I'll see you in court and I had no statements at all." Tr. 30. Officer Wahlin
disputes this statement. See Tr. 13.
However, because of this conflict in the evidence, the trial judge stated in his
findings that the case came down to a
contest of credibility between [] Mr. Yager and the two police officers. Of
course they testified they saw [Mr. Yager], they saw the pipe pass back and
forth between [Mr. Yager] and the co-defendant in this case. [Mr. Yager's]
testimony was to the contrary that only she had been smoking from the
pipe. So that a contest of credibility if I believe the officer's beyond a
reasonable doubt then I can find [Mr. Yager] guilty in this case. If I find
reasonable doubt based on [Mr. Yager's] testimony then I would have to
find [Mr. Yager] not guilty.
Tr. 35.
There was a real dispute between Mr. Yager and the officers regarding his
statements at the time of his arrest. This dispute in the testimony is precisely what Ms.
Horvath's testimony would have addressed. Ms. Horvath would have testified, in support
of Mr. Yager on this issue.
Further, the testimony of all three witnesses states that Ms. Horvath admitted that
the marijuana pipe was hers and that the marijuana was hers. Ms. Horvath, having so
forthrightly admitted at the time of the arrest that she was the primary party in the
possession and use of the marijuana and the marijuana pipe, would have testified to these
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matters at the time of trial. Moreover, her own actions indicate her culpable mental state.
She was the person who threw away the pipe at the sudden approach of the officers. She
further admitted this to the officers and she even showed the officers where she had
thrown the pipe so the officer could retrieve it and take it into evidence.
Although defense counsel was able to establish Ms. Horvath's conduct in the
offense, she was unable to fully develop Ms. Horvath's knowledge of Mr. Yager's part.
Besides the officers, Ms. Horvath was the only other party present and her testimony
would have independently established Mr. Yager's actions in these matters. She was
present at the time, she admitted her participation in the criminal conduct and she was
also present during the conversation between the officers and Mr. Yager. She could have
confirmed that Mr. Yager made no admissions regarding using the marijuana or the
marijuana pipe and that he did not smoke from the marijuana pipe.
Ms. Horvath was also as disinterested a party as could be found for these matters.
She admitted to the criminal conduct at the time of her arrest. She again necessarily
admitted to the conduct when her case was resolved. See Judgment and Conviction of
Breanna Horvath in Addendum B. She had no interest in the outcome of Mr. Yager's
case beyond that of ensuring that justice be done and the testimony of all the participants
be fully presented to the trial court.
B.

The Trial Would Not Have Been Unreasonably Delayed Because
Ms. Horvath Could Have Been Produced Within a Reasonable
Amount of Time

As defense counsel stated previous to the trial, Ms. Horvath wished to testify on
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Mr. Yager's behalf. Tr. 3. She had planned on doing so, however, because of the late
notice of the trial, she could not make the Monday afternoon trial date.
A new date, when all witnesses could be present to testify would not have greatly
inconvenienced the court, the officers or the city prosecutor nor would it have
unreasonably delayed the trial. The two city witnesses were police officers who are
required, as part of their duties, to attend and testify at trial at cases in which they played
a part. Provisions are made for them to do so. Further, being then present, they could
have immediately informed the court of any conflict in their schedule in setting a new
trial date.
Moreover, as discussed above, bench trials are routinely handled on misdemeanor
city days on the court's calendar. There was nothing in Mr. Yager's case that would
require a special setting for his bench trial. Any misdemeanor city day, at the court's
convenience, would have sufficed and guaranteed the presence of both the city prosecutor
and defense counsel. Longcrier, 943 P.2d at 660. Indeed, all parties would necessarily be
present and Ms. Horvath would then have sufficient time to clear her schedule and attend
to testify on Mr. Yager's behalf.
At the time of the trial, there had not been sufficient time to subpoena Ms. Horvath
and compel her attendance. Utah R. Crim. P. 14 (2002). Had a subpoena been issued on
Friday to compel her attendance on Monday afternoon, this would most likely have been
inadequate notice for her to come and testify. Utah R. Crim. P. 14(b) (stating that "The
court may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable"). She
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had, in fact, previous to the trial informed the defense that she would be unable to come,
having not had sufficient notice to make the necessary arrangements to free her schedule
and appear.
C.

Defense Counsel Exercised Due Diligence in Preparing for
the Bench Trial Before Requesting the Continuance Prior to
the Start of the Trial

Defense counsel exercised due diligence in attempting to prepare for Mr. Yager's
case. Defense counsel was not present when the bench trial was set. Although the Salt
Lake Legal Defender Association was appointed on July 16, 2001, by Judge Reese, when
defendant appeared before Judge Quinn on July 25,2001 for the pre-trial conference, he
was not represented by counsel. R. 15, 17. Nevertheless, the trial court set Mr. Yager's
case for a bench trial. R. 17. Notice of Mr. Yager's bench trial had to be sent to the
offices of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, processed, and a file opened for his
case before the request for discovery could be sent. The request for discovery was filed
on August 15, 2001. R. 21-23. Eight days later, the response was filed from the city
prosecutor's office. R. 15-26. Two business days later, the trial was held against defense
counsel's objection. R. 27-29; Tr. 1-3.
Once discovery was received on Thursday, August 23rd, defense counsel met with
Mr. Yager the next day, on Friday, to discuss the discovery, the issues in his case and the
possible defenses available to him. Tr. 3. Mr. Yager indicated that Ms. Horvath would
be willing to testify. Based upon this representation, Ms Horvath was contacted. She
confirmed that she would testify on Mr. Yager's behalf but because of the late notice, she
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could not attend the trial on the following Monday. Tr. 2-3. As discussed above, there
was insufficient time to issue a subpoena to compel her attendance.
Contrary to the city prosecutor's belief, receiving discovery on Thursday was not
sufficient time to prepare for a bench trial on Monday, despite defense counsel's efforts.
Tr. 1. The continuance of the trial would have ensured the presence of all parties and
have allowed Mr. Yager to fully present his defense to the allegations against him,
including the witnesses that would speak on his behalf. By denying the continuance, the
trial court denied Mr. Yager these fundamental constitutional guarantees. U.S. Const,
amend. V.; Utah Const. Art. I, § 7; U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const. Art. I, § 12;
Schreuder. 712 P.2d at 274-75

D.

The Absence of Mr. Yager's Essential Witness Materially Prejudiced Mr.
Yager and Further, the Result of the Trial Would Have Been Different Had
Ms. Horvath Been Able to Testify on Defendant's Behalf

By denying the continuance, the trial court, in essence, undercut Mr. Yager's
defense. He was unable to fully explore the actions of officers, their statements, and any
admissions that they said he made. The Oliver court determined that the party
challenging the denial of a continuance must make one of two showings of prejudice in
order to prevail upon appeal: that the moving party was materially prejudiced by the
court's denial of the continuance or that the trial result would have been different had the
continuance been granted. Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476 (citing State v. Barker, 667 P.2d 108,
114(1983)).
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Mr. Yager was materially prejudiced by the absence of Ms. Horvath at his trial.
As stated above, the trial court based its ruling on the credibility of the two officers
against Mr. Yager. Had Ms. Horvath been present, she could have provided an
independent view to the matters at issue and swayed the view of the trial court. She could
have provided information to impeach the officers, she certainly could have supported the
testimony of Mr. Yager that he did not make admissions to the officers that he had
smoked the marijuana and support his statement that he did not smoke marijuana that day.
Without Ms. Horvath, Mr. Yager could do little more in his defense but deny the
testimony of the officers.
In his ruling, the trial court focused upon Mr. Yager's knowledge of Ms. Horvath's
drug use. The trial court stated that it disbelieved Mr. Yager's entire testimony because
he "maintained] that [he] had no idea that she was smoking marijuana. That [he] didn't
recognize the smell, couldn't tell from the way that she was smoking the pipe if she was
smoking marijuana." Tr. 35. While the court misconstrued Mr. Yager's testimony,2 such
a narrow focus could have been balanced by Ms. Horvath's own admissions and any
2

The exchange between the trial court judge and Mr. Yager proceeded as follows.
Judge: ...Mr. Yager (inaudible) to testify that you did not realize the person sitting
next to you was smoking marijuana?
Yager:
I did not ask any questions, she did not inform me of anything.
Judge:
Why, you don't recognize the smell of marijuana?
Yager:
I...you know...there was no discussion about any of that.
Judge:
But I asked you a different question now. Do you recognize the
smell of marijuana?
Yager:
I do recognize the smell of marijuana.
Judge:
And you couldn't tell whether that person was smoking marijuana?
Yager:
I didn't recall.
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statements she made to him about her marijuana use that day.
Yet, because the court had only Mr. Yager's denials of involvement in any
criminal activity that day, his testimony was greatly outweighed by the testimony of the
two officers. The court found that it did not believe Mr. Yager's "entire testimony with
respect to whether the pipe was being passed back and forth" and stated that "I am
therefore going to find that the officer's testimony is more credible beyond a reasonable
doubt and find you guilty." Tr. 35.
Mr. Yager was materially prejudiced by Ms. Horvath's absence because Ms.
Horvath could not testify to her own recollection of the events, Mr. Yager's participation,
and to his ability to know whether or not she was smoking marijuana. Ms. Horvath
testimony could directly address each of these issues and could have placed Mr. Yager's
statements into perspective. This necessary perspective could have righted the balance
between the testimony of the officers and the defense put forward by Mr. Yager.
Mr. Yager should also have a new trial because the outcome of his case would
have been different if Ms. Horvath could have been present to testify on his behalf.
Oliver. 820 P.2d at 476. The testimony put forth at trial, clearly presented a picture where
Ms. Horvath was the primary wrongdoer. Moreover, she was frank in admitting her
conduct to the officers. Her testimony regarding Mr. Yager's conduct would have held a
substantial amount of weight because of that prior frankness.
At the time of her arrest, Ms. Horvath admitted to owning the pipe and the
marijuana. Tr. 22. She admitting to smoking the marijuana. Tr. 22. She admitted to
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throwing the pipe away at the approach of the officers. Tr. 7. Her anticipated testimony
that Mr. Yager had not smoked marijuana could have swayed the trial court. Doubting
Mr. Yager's testimony, the court could have alternatively relied upon Ms. Horvath's
testimony. She had nothing to gain or lose in testifying, having already pled guilty and
received her punishment for her conduct. See Judgment and Conviction of Breanna
Horvath in Addendum B. Correctly weighing Ms. Horvath's testimony with the
testimony of the three other participants in the trial, the trial court could have found Mr.
Yager innocent of the charges against him.
The absence of Ms. Horvath at Mr. Yager's trial irrevocably damaged his defense.
Ms. Horvath was a vital component of Mr. Yager's defense. Without her, Mr. Yager had
nothing but his own protestations of innocence against the testimony of two police
officers who stated that they saw him passing a marijuana pipe back and forth. The
absence of Ms. Horvath, because of the denial of the continuance, essentially denied Mr.
Yager any meaningful defense and prejudiced his case.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Yager was materially prejudiced by the denial of the continuance in his case.
Not only was he unable to fully prepare for his case, raising all available defenses on his
behalf, he was also denied the presence of an essential witness to speak on his behalf.
The trial court abused its discretion in denying him a reasonable continuance to subpoena
the witness and prepare his defense. Due to these violations of his right to due process
and his right to compel witnesses to speak on his behalf, Mr. Yager respectfully requests
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that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

SUBMITTED this

^

day of April, 2002.

BRENDA M. VIERA
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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